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that the provisions making possible a declaratory judgment do not
contemplate that courts shall determine the precise rights existing
between public officers and questionable violators of the law, by
declaring in advance, whether certain shady transactions do or do not
constitute a crime.' 3 The opposite conclusion has been reached in
Oregon-' and Utah, 15 in somewhat similar cases. Both of those
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
whereas New York has not. However, the New York Act does not
apparently differ from the Uniform Declaratory judgments Act in
any respect which would suggest a principle upon which the Oregon
and Utah cases could be distinguished from the instant case.
The discretionary power of the court is best exemplified in situations of this type, when, in the exercise of such discretion, the dignity
of the court can be protected from declaring whether options on dogs
at this time, or options on horses at a later date, or other cleverly
devised gambling schemes constitute a crime. The equitable maxim
of "Clean Hands" relegates petitioners of this
7 type of action to the
established tribunals of criminal jurisdiction.
H.K.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF

DOmESTIC

RELATIONS CoURT.--The defendants contributed to a minor's delinquency and this proceeding is brought by virtue of the Domestic Re"Instant case at p. 252. Contra: 97 N. Y. L. J. 30, Feb. 5, 1937, p. 4,
col. 3.'
, Multnomah County Fair Ass'n v. Langley, 140 Ore. 172, 13 P. (2d) 354
(1932) (determination at the instance of a county fair whether a proposed

game of chance would amount to a lottery and thus violate a statute).
' Utah State Fair Ass'n v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926)
(privileged to conduct horse racing without danger of prosecution). Also see:
Faulkner v. City of Keene, 85 N. H. 147, 155 Atl. 195 (1931); Rosenberg v.
Village of Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N. W. 838 (1929).
"Editorial, 'N. Y. L. J., p. 620, col. 1, Feb. 5, 1937.
'7 distinguished authority on the subject of Declaratory judgments,
Edwin M. Borchard, Hotchkiss Professor of Law at Yale University, comments
as follows on the instant case: "It would seem to me that the court has been
misled. The plaintiff seeks not an advisory opinion. but a binding and final
judgment on a question of law. The court might send the case back for trial
to determine the full facts, if these were doubtful, but I do not think that it is
authorized to dismiss the case on the ground that it seeks an advisory opinion,
or that it is a substitution of a civil for a criminal action, or that there is no
authority for this kind of action. The public officials are not indeed claiming
any right of property in the dogs. They are merely threatening to send the
plaintiff to prison and ruin his business. That gives him a fully matured legal
interest to have the court determine as a matter of law that the threat is
unfounded and unjustified, and that he is legally privileged to run his business
as he is now operating it. Unless there is a doubt on-the facts, the court is in
a position to decide that question of law, and by doing so serves a valuable
social function." (Correspondence, N. Y. L. J., p. 620, col. 3, Feb. 5, 1937.)
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RECENT DECISIONS

lations Court Act, Section 61, (2), which confers on the Domestic
Relations Court criminaljurisdiction to punish all adults for acts contributing to the delinquency of minors.1 The defendants contend that
the legislature has overreached its authority in conferring criminal
jurisdiction inasmuch as it was empowered to confer only civil jurisdiction on the Domestic Relations Court. Held: The legislature, by
constitutional provision, 2 was authorized to confer such jurisdiction
on the Domestic Relations Court as may prove necessary and the
former is the sole body to determine the necessity. Therefore the
statute conferring criminal jurisdiction on the Domestic Relations
Court is constitutional. Zainbrotto v. Jannette, et al., 160 Misc. 558,
290 N. Y. Supp. 338 (1936).
The Domestic Relations Court, a statutory court,3 was primarily
founded to protect and rehabilitate child-life rather than to punish
children. 4 Since it is a statutory court, the jurisdiction which might
be conferred upon it must be found in a constitutional provision. 5
Powers which are prohibited by the New York Constitution or reserved exclusively to other courts may not be conferred by statute
upon the Domestic Relations Court. 6 However, powers specifically
conferred on courts in language sufficiently clear as to its import, when
not prohibited or reserved to other courts by the constitution, cannot
7
be taken away by words whose interpretation is open to serious doubt.
The powers of the Domestic Relations Court were extended by amendment, so that where formerly it had only jurisdiction to hear and determine acts of parents or those standing in loco parentiscontributing
to juvenile delinquency, s it may now punish all adults whose offense
is of a lesser grade than a felony. 9 In the recent cases of Kane v.
Necci 0 and People of the State of New York v. Rogers," decided
' Domestic Relations Court Act § 61 (2) reads as follows: "Such court
shall also have jurisdiction whenever the issues involving a delinquent child are
before the court, summarily to try, hear and determine any charge or offense
less than the grade of felony against any person alleged to have contributed to
such child's delinquency and may impose the punishment provided by law for
such 2 offense."
N. Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 13.
'N. Y. Laws 1933, § 61 (2), as amended by N. Y. Laws (1936).
'N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 482, § 61 (2), as amended by N. Y. Laws (1936)
c. 346, § 4; N. Y. CONST. art. V1, § 18.
. Gardner v. Ginther, 257 N. Y. 578, 178 N. E. 802 (1929).
People v. Hopkins, 208 App. Div. 438, 203 N. Y. Supp. 653 (3d Dept.
1924), appeal dismissed, 239 N. Y. 589, 147 N. E. 207 (1924); Schley v.
Donlin, 131 Misc. 208, 225 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1927); City of Brooklyn v. City
of New York, 25 Hun 612 (N. Y. 1881).
People ex rel. Paris v. Agent and Warden of State Prison, Comstock,
N. Y., 118 Misc. 44, 192 N. Y. Supp. 692 (1922),, order reversed, Same v.
Hunt, 201 App. Div. 573, 194 N. Y. Supp. 699 (3d Dept. 1922); 234 N. Y.
558, 138 N. E. 445 (1922).
'N. Y. Laws 1933 c. 482, § 61 (2).
o N. Y. Laws 1933 c. 482, § 61 (2), as amended by N. Y. Laws 1936.
10269 N. Y. 13, 17, 198 N. E. 613, 615 (1935).
"248 App. Div. 141, 288 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dept. 1936).
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prior to the amendment, it was held that these proceedings were not
of a criminal nature as they have been shifted to the civil side of the
courts and that the acts involved were to be treated as civil offenses2
inasmuch as the Domestic Relations Court is not a criminal court.1
However, the cases mentioned supra do not hold that the state legislature has not the power to confer criminal jurisdiction upon this
court if it so desires. Besides Article 6, Section 18 of the New York
Constitution 13 specifically empowers the legislature to confer such
jurisdiction as may be necessary to punish offenses of adults who contribute to juvenile delinquency and thereby impliedly gives the legislature authority to confer criminal jurisdiction on the Domestic Relations Court.
H. R. K.

EMINENT

DOMAIN-ESCHEAT-MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS.-

By a holographic will, deceased attempted to convey a life interest in
property located in New York City to his illegitimate daughter and
the fee to his daughter-in-law, petitioner herein. The will was invalid
because it was not witnessed in accordance with the laws of New
York. The daughter as sole heir was barred from taking by intestacy
by reason of her illegitimacy, and as a result, the property escheated
to the state. The illegitimate daughter died in 1912. In 1916 while
title was in the state, the City of New York acquired title to part of
the property by condemnation. In 1918, the legislature, acting upon
a petition of the daughter-in-law, passed a special act which authorized the commissioners of the land office to release to her all the property of the intestate which had escheated to the state. In 1919, the
city made an award for the property condemned and in the same
decree levied an assessment for benefit against the portion which the
city had not condemned. In 1924 the Supreme Court ruled that the
legislature had released the interest held by the state by the passage
of the special act. Petitioner did not make application pursuant to
the special act until 1933, at which time the commissioners passed
title to the land to her. Petitioner then made application for the
award. Petitioner claims that at the time of the condemnation title
was in the state; and since the city cannot condemn or assess state
property without the permission of the state, and such permission
was not given, the condemnation and assessment fall; but petitioner
may ratify the condemnation proceedings and claim the award apart
1269 N. Y. 13, 17, 198 N. E. 613, 615 (1935); 248 App. Div. 141, 288
N. Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dept. 1936).
" N. Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18: "The legislature may establish ** * courts
of domestic relations * * * and may confer on them such jurisdiction as may
be necessary * * * for the punishment of adults contributing to such delinquency,
neglect or dependency."

